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1 Introduction
Boom-bust cycles in asset prices and economic activity are a central issue in policy and
academic debates. Particular attention has been given to the behavior of housing prices
and housing investment. This paper suggests a mechanism for modeling housing-market
boom-bust cycles in accordance with the empirical pattern. We document that, over the last
three decades, housing prices boom-bust cycles in the United States have been characterized
by co-movement in GDP, consumption, investment, hours worked, real wages and housing
investment. Moreover, housing prices peaks are often followed by macroeconomic recessions.
Modeling endogenous boom-bust cycles in macroeconomics is a major challenge. An
often-heard explanation of housing booms is optimism about future house price appreciation.
It is plausible to think that optimism about house prices is related to current or expected
macroeconomic developments. Our explanation builds on a “news shock” mechanism where
public signals of future fundamentals cause business cycle fluctuations through changes in
household expectations. Booms are generated by public signals; busts follow if the signals are
not realized ex-post. To this purpose, we extend the model of the housing market developed
by Iacoviello and Neri (2009) to include expectations of future macroeconomic developments.
We rely on their estimated model since it is rich enough to explore the role of alternative
sources of optimism about future house prices originating from developments in different
sectors of the economy: the credit market, the housing market, the production sector and
the conduct of monetary policy.
This paper provides several insightful results. We document that unanticipated shocks
fail in generating either hump-shaped dynamics or the observed co-movement among hours
worked, investment, GDP and house prices. A necessary condition for a boom to emerge is
that agents expect a future increase in housing prices, which fuels current housing demand
and lifts housing prices immediately. The increase in housing prices is coupled with an en-
dogenous increase in household indebtedness, which stems from the fact that households
borrow a fraction of the future expected value of their houses. Busts occur if expectations
are not fulfilled, which implies a dramatic drop in both aggregate quantities and prices. Ac-
cordingly, several types of expectation-driven cycles can generate fluctuations in the housing
market. Changes in expectations about future productivity, investment costs, housing sup-
ply, inflation, the policy rate and the central bank’s target can generate housing-market
boom-bust cycles characterized by co-movement in GDP, consumption, investment, hours
and real wages. However, only expectations of future expansionary monetary policy that are
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not met are likely to cause a boom-bust cycle and a subsequent macroeconomic recession.
This paper also explores the role of lending standards for housing market fluctuations.
In the model, the increase in housing prices generated by changes in expectations is always
coupled with an endogenous increase in household indebtedness. However, improvement in
the access to credit per se is often considered as one of the main drivers of housing booms. We
document that an exogenous easing of credit conditions generates boom-bust cycle dynamics
only if the current favorable situation in the credit market is expected to be reversed in the
near future.
Since Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2007), a growing strand of the business cycle literature
investigated the role of changes in expectations or news about the future state of produc-
tivity as a source of business cycle fluctuations. Changes in expectations may prove to be
an important mechanism in creating business cycle fluctuations if they generate pro-cyclical
movements in consumption, hours and investment. However, as already shown by Beaudry
and Portier (2004, 2007), a standard one-sector real business cycle model is unable to gen-
erate boom-bust cycles in response to news. This is due to the wealth effect generated by
expectations of improved future macroeconomic conditions that make consumption increase
and hours worked fall at the time of the signal. Several papers explore the role of alternative
modeling features in the transmission of expectations-driven cycles. Christiano, Ilut, Motto,
and Rostagno (2008) show that for the price of capital to be positively correlated with all
other aggregate variables, an inflation targeting central bank and nominal wages stickier
than prices are needed. Differently from previous studies we aim at reproducing empirically
plausible boom-bust cycles in the housing market. We document that expectations on fu-
ture productivity generate business cycle fluctuations in a model of the housing market that
features collateralized household debt, standard preferences and production functions, and
standard assumptions about nominal rigidities, both in prices and wages.
Compared to previous literature, a novel element in this paper is the introduction of
changes in expectations on shocks related to the conduct of monetary policy or developments
in the credit and housing market. We also study the role of credit market development
in economies subject to boom-bust cycles. We analyze how the degree of credit market
development affects the the long-run properties of the model, the transmission of news shocks
and the implied volatility. At the steady state, economies with a lower degree of credit
frictions are characterized by higher aggregate consumption, investment and GDP. Credit
market conditions also play an important role in the transmission of expectations-driven
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cycles. Economies characterized by easier access to credit have higher volatility of aggregate
consumption and household indebtedness but not necessarily of GDP if variations in relative
prices enter its measurement.
A few papers have investigated the role of collateral requirements for the transmission of
shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) show that, conditional
on productivity shocks, easier access to credit imply lower volatility of output, consumption,
and hours worked. According to their findings, the U.S. mortgage market liberalization
of the early 1990s played a role in explaining the great moderation. On the other hand,
Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2009) show that the transmission of monetary policy shocks
to residential investment and consumption is stronger for lower values of the down-payment
ratio. This literature however abstracts from the possibility of expectations-driven fluctua-
tions. In particular, none of these papers analyzes the relationship between credit market
developments and the occurrence and impact of boom-bust cycles in the housing market.
It is important to stress that the goal of this paper is not to explain exactly what happened
in a specific country, but to draw qualitative conclusions on the plausibility of changes in
expectations as a mechanism to generate boom-bust cycles in the housing market. However,
given the robustness of the results to different model’s parameters, our findings can be
generalized to any industrialized country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the average behavior
of several macroeconomic variables during four boom-bust episodes in the U.S. housing
market in the last four decades. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 studies the
dynamics of the model under unexpected shocks and Section 5 investigates the occurrence of
boom-bust cycles in the housing market as a consequence of expectations regarding future
macroeconomic developments. Section 6 analyzes the role of credit market development on
the steady state and volatility of the economy. Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts about Housing Boom-Bust Episodes
and the Macro-economy
Figure 1 shows a number of macroeconomic variables in the United States over the period
1965:1 to 2009:2. These variables are: Consumption, GDP, business investment, residential
investment, home mortgage liabilities, house prices, hours worked and wages in the consump-
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tion sector, hours worked and wages in the housing sector, inflation and the real interest rate.
Appendix A describes the data in detail. Aggregate variables are log-transformed, real, per
capita with base in 1965:1. Real house prices in the United States trend upward over the
sample period. From 1965:1 to 2009:2, real house prices increased by more than 66%. Ac-
cording to Iacoviello and Neri (2009), the positive trend in real house prices reflects faster
productivity in the consumer-good sector relative to the construction sector.
Real house prices also display a number of boom-bust episodes, namely periods of faster-
than-trend growth followed by sharp reversals. We define a peak as the centered maximum
in real house prices in a twenty-one-quarters window, excluding end points. Using this
definition, we identify four peaks in real house prices in the United States: 1973:3; 1979:4;
1989:2; 2006:2. The vertical lines in Figure 1 indicate the peak dates.1 Our definition of
peak is robust to de-trending, either with a linear trend or with an Hodrick-Prescott filter.2
Interestingly, real house prices peaks are followed by macroeconomic recessions. The
grey shaded areas in Figure 1 indicate recession dates according to the National Bureau of
Economic Research.3 Every housing peak as defined above has been followed by an economic
downturn. Even the housing price high of 1969:4, which does not qualify as a peak according
to our definition because real house prices rebounded too quickly, was followed by a recession.
We are interested in characterizing the behavior of our macroeconomic variables during
these four boom-bust episodes. First we consider the average behavior of our macroeconomic
variables over the four peak episodes. Figure 2 shows the average behavior of these series in
the twenty-one quarter window around a peak date. The vertical line indicates the peak in
1A more stringent definition would require the peak to be the high of a longer centered window. For
example, if we require the window to be twenty-five quarters, as in Ahearne et al. (2005), the 1973:3 high
in real house prices would fail to be a peak. In general, upward trending house prices make it difficult to
identify peaks in long, centered windows because prices do not fall all the way to the levels they had at the
beginning of the boom. On the other hand, a shorter centered window of seventeen quarters would deliver
an additional peak in 1969:4.
2Using the H-P filter and the twenty-one quarters definition of window would deliver two additional peaks
in 1994:1 and 1999:2, the same peaks in 1973:3, 1979:4 and 1989:2, and it would put the most recent peak
in 2007:1.
3At the time the paper was written, the National Bureau of Economic Research had dated the beginning
of the recession in 2007:4 but not its end. Figure 7 assumes that the recession was not over yet as of the end
of boom-bust window in 2008:4.
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real house prices.
On average real house prices are pro-cyclical during boom-bust episodes. In fact, real
house prices peak when real GDP reaches a maximum. Figures 4 to 7 illustrate the behavior
of the macroeconomic variables of interest in each peak episode. Real personal consumption
also increases during the boom in real house prices and peaks around the same time as the
peak in real GDP and house prices. Real private residential investment reaches its maximum
before the peak in house prices and falls rapidly afterward. On the other hand, real private
nonresidential investment increases during the boom period, peaks after the peak in housing
prices and falls afterward. Hours worked follow closely the dynamics of real house prices,
both in the construction and in the consumption-good sector.
On average real loans grow during the boom phase and peak several quarters after the
peak in housing prices. Inspection of the four peak episodes reveals that real loans typically
peak at the beginning of the recession that follows the bust in housing prices. In the 1973:3
and 1979:4 episodes real GDP and real loans peak immediately after housing prices; in
the 2006:2 episode real GDP and real loans peak only some quarters after housing prices.
The 1989:2 housing peak is an exception, as real loans continued to grow despite a fall in
housing prices. The evidence that real loans grow during the boom phase and fall during
the bust phase of housing prices is in line with the findings in Kannan, Rabanal and Scott
(2009), who consider several countries and find evidence of higher-than-normal growth rates
of credit relative to GDP in the run-ups to house price busts since 1985. They also find large
deteriorations in current account balances and higher-than-normal ratios of investment to
GDP after 1985 but not before it. Further differences among peak episodes are discussed in
Appendix B.
Inflation follows real house prices and other macroeconomic variables with some lags. On
average, inflation increases before the peak in house prices, reaches a maximum after the
peak in house prices and then falls. The real interest rate, measured by the three months
Treasury bill minus inflation, increases throughout the boom period, peaks around the time
of or just after the peak in house prices, and then it falls rapidly. Real wages are pro-cyclical
during boom-bust episodes. Real wages in the consumption-good sector rise in the boom
and fall in the bust phase. Real wages in the construction sector have a similar pattern
with a couple of differences: They peak before real house prices (and real wages in the
consumption-good sector) and they fall much more rapidly after that.
Next we transform our variables in deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and then
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calculate the average over the four housing-peak episodes. This allows us to see if housing
boom-bust episodes are accompanied by below- or above-trend behavior of some variables.
Figure 3 shows the data. A number of observations are in order. Real house prices, real
GDP, private consumption and investment, both residential and nonresidential, and real
loans fall below trend at the end of the bust phase. Models featuring unanticipated shocks
that eventually die away cannot reproduce this feature of the data. The real interest rate is
below trend at the beginning of the boom phase, consistent with the evidence in Figure 2.
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that housing booms have been accompanied
by low real interest rates. Real wages start at or above trend, the reach a maximum before
the peak in real house prices and then fall well below trend.
Table 1 displays the correlation of our Hodrick-Prescott filtered variables with real house
prices and their standard deviation. The first column reports the statistics over the en-
tire sample, 1965:1 to 2009:2; the second column displays the same statistics over the four
twenty-one quarter windows centered around the peaks identified earlier. GDP, consumption,
business investment, real loans, hours and real wages become more positively correlated, or
maintain the same correlation, with real house prices during boom-bust episodes. On the
other hand, the real interest rate and inflation are less correlated with real house prices dur-
ing boom-bust episodes. All variables except business investment are more volatile during
peak episodes. The increase in volatility is substantial for real wages, inflation, residential
investment, the real interest rate and consumption.
3 The Model
We adopt the model of the housing market developed by Iacoviello and Neri (2009) since it
allows us to investigate the transmission mechanism of news related to the housing market,
credit market, the production sector and the conduct of monetary policy on future house
price appreciation. In the following, we report the main features of the model. The model’s
parameters are set equal to the mean of the posterior distribution estimated by Iacoviello
and Neri (2009) for the U.S. economy.
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3.1 Households
The economy is populated by two types of households: the Saver and the Borrower. They
both work in the good- and housing-sector of production, consume and accumulate housing.
They differ in their discount factors, (β and β
′
). Borrowers (denoted by ′) feature a relatively
lower subjective discount factor that in equilibrium generates an incentive to anticipate fu-
ture consumption to the current period through borrowing. Hence, the ex-ante heterogeneity
induces credit flows between the two types of agents. This modeling feature has been intro-
duced in macro models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended by Iacoviello (2005) to
a business cycle framework with housing investment.
The Saver maximizes the utility function with respect to :
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
(βGC)
t
[
Γc ln (ct − εct−1) + jt ln ht − τ
1 + η
(n1+ξc,t + n
1+ξ
h,t )
1+η
1+ξ
]
subject to:
ct+qt
(
ht−(1−δh)ht−1
)
+
[
kc,t
Ak,t
−
(
1− δk
Ak,t
+Rc,tzc,t
)
kct−1
]
+φc,t+[kh,t(1− δk +Rh,tzh,t)kht−1] +
φh,t + kb,t + pl,tlt − bt + Rt−1bt−1
pit
≤ wc,tnc,t
Xwc,t
+
wh,tnh,t
Xwh,t
+ pb,tkb,t + (pl,t +Rl,t)lt−1 +Dt
where c, h , nc and nh are consumption, housing services, hours worked in the good-sector and
in the construction-sector, respectively. The parameter ξ defines the degree of substitution
between the two sectors in terms of hours worked,4 while η is the inverse of Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. jt determines the relative weight in utility of housing services, Rt is the
lending interest rate, δc and δh represent the depreciation rate for capital and housing stock,
respectively. lt is the land priced at pl,t and qt is the price of the houses, all relative to
the CPI. zc,t and zh,t are the capital utilization rates of transforming potential capital into
effective capital in the two sectors. Dt are lump-sum profits paid to households. The
term Ak,t is an investment-specific technology that captures the marginal cost of producing
4For a value of ξ close to zero, hours worked in the two sectors are close to perfect substitutes, which
means that the worker would devote most of the time to the sector that pays the highest wage. Positive
values of ξ imply, instead, that hours worked are far from perfect substitutes, thus the worker is less willing
to diversify her working hours across sectors even in the presence of a wage differential (see Horvath (2000)
for details)
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consumption-good-sector specific capital.5 GC , GIKc and GIKhare the trend growth rates
of real consumption and capital used in the two sectors of production. Γc and Γ
′
c represent
scaling factors of the marginal utilities of consumption. Wages are set in a monopolistic way
and can be adjusted subject to a Calvo scheme with probability 1− θw every period. Xwc,t
and Xwh,t are markups on the wages paid in the two sectors. Both households set wages in
a monopolistic way.
The Borrower maximizes the utility function:
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
(β
′
GC)
t
[
Γ
′
c ln (c
′
t − ε
′
c
′
t−1) + jt ln h
′
t −
τ
1 + η′
((n
′
c,t)
1+ξ
′
+ (n
′
h,t)
1+ξ
′
)
1+η
′
1+ξ
′
]
subject to:
c
′
t + qt
[
h
′
t − (1− δh)h
′
t−1
]
− b′t ≤
w
′
c,tn
′
c,t
X
′
wc,t
+
w
′
h,tn
′
h,t
X
′
wh,t
+D
′
t −
Rt−1b
′
t−1
pit
and
b
′
t ≤ mtEt
(
qt+1h
′
tpit+1
Rt
)
β′ ∈ (0, β) captures the Borrower’s relative impatience.
Limits on borrowing are introduced through the assumption that households cannot
borrow more than a fraction of the next-period value of the housing stock. The fraction m,
referred to as the equity requirement or loan-to-value ratio, should not exceed one and is
treated as exogenous to the model. It can be interpreted as the creditor’s overall judicial costs
in case of debtor default and represents the degree of credit frictions in the economy. The
borrowing constraint is consistent with standard lending criteria used in the mortgage and
consumer loan markets. We explore the effects of temporary deviations from the established
degree of credit market access by assuming that mt is stochastic. We refer to this as a
loan-to-value ratio shock.
5φc,t =
φkc
2GIKc
(
kc,t
kc,t−1
− GIKc
)2
kc,t−1
(1+γAK)t
is the good-sector capital adjustment cost, and φh,t =
φkh
2GIKh
(
kh,t
kh,t−1
−GIKh
)2
kh,t−1 is the housing-sector capital adjustment cost; γAK represents the net growth
rate of technology in business capital, φkc and φkh indicate the coefficients for adjustment cost (i.e., the rel-
ative prices of installing the existing capital) for capital used in the consumption sector and housing sector
respectively.
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3.2 Firms
Final good producing firms produce non-durable goods (Y) and new houses (IH). Both
sectors face Cobb-Douglas production functions. The housing sector uses capital, k, land, l,
and labor supplied by the Savers, n, and the Borrowers, n
′
, as inputs of production.
IHt =
(
Ah,t
(
nαh,t + n
′ 1−α
h,t
))1−µh−µb−µl
(zh,tkh,t−1)µhk
µb
b l
µl
t−1.
The non-housing sector produces consumption and business capital using labor and capital.
Yt =
(
Ac,t
(
nαc,t + n
′ 1−α
c,t
))1−µc
(zc,tkc,t−1)µc .
Ah,t and Ac,t are the productivity shocks to the housing- and good-sector, respectively.
Firms pay the wages to households and repay back the rented capital to the Savers.
The intermediate good-sector is populated by a continuum of monopolistically compet-
itive firms owned by the Savers. Prices can be adjusted by each producer with probability
1− θpi every period, following a Calvo-setting. Monopolistic competition occurs at the retail
level, leading to the following forward-looking Philips curve:
lnpit − ιpilnpit−1 = βGC
(
Etlnpit+1 − ιpilnpit
)
− piln(Xt/X) + up,t
where pi =
(1−θpi)(1−βθpi)
θpi
, Xt represents the price markup and up,t is a cost-push shock. In
contrast, housing prices are assumed to be flexible.
3.3 Monetary Policy Rule
We assume that the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule as estimated by Iacoviello and
Neri (2009):
Rt = R
rR
t−1pi
(1−rR)rpi
t
(
GDPt
GCGDPt−1
)(1−rR)rY
rr(1−rR)
uR,t
As,t
, (1)
where rr is the steady-state real interest rate and uR,t is a monetary policy shock. The
central bank’s target is assumed to be time varying and subject to a persistent shock, st, as
in Smets and Wouters (2003). Following Iacoviello and Neri (2009), GDP is defined as the
sum of consumption and investment at constant prices. Thus
GDPt = Ct + IKt + qIHt,
where q is real housing prices along the balanced growth path.
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3.4 News Shocks
The model assumes heterogeneous deterministic trends in productivity in the consumption
(Ac,t), investment (Ak,t), and housing sector (Ah,t), such that
ln(Az,t) = t ln(1 + γAz) + ln(Zz,t),
where γAz are the net growth rates of technology in each sector,
ln(Zz,t) = ρAz ln(Zz,t−1) + uz,t.
uz,t is the innovation and z = {c, k, h} . The inflation target (As,t) and loan-to-value ratio
(m) shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1) process. The cost-push shock (up,t) and the
shock to the policy rule (uR,t) are assumed to be i.i.d.
6 To introduce expectations of future
macroeconomic developments, we follow Christiano et al. (2008) in assuming that the error
term of each shock consists of an unanticipated component, εz,t, and an anticipated change
n quarters in advance, εz,t−n,
uz,t = εz,t + εz,t−n,
where εz,t is i.i.d. and z = {h, c, R, s, p, j, k,m} . Thus, at time t agents receive a signal
about future macroeconomic conditions at time t + n. If the expected movement doesn’t
occur, then εz,t = −εz,t−n and uz,t = 0.
4 Unanticipated Shocks
Optimism about house prices could be related to both current or expected macroeconomic
developments. In the following we assess weather macroeconomic developments lead by
unanticipated shocks can replicate the empirical pattern displayed by the data during periods
of boom-bust in house prices. Figure 8 reports the effect of current shocks on house prices
and on selected macroeconomic variables. The first three columns display the effects of a
monetary policy, uR,t, housing demand and supply shock, jt and Ah,t, respectively. According
to Iacoviello and Neri (2009), housing demand and supply shocks explain one-quarter each
of fluctuations in housing prices and housing investment. They also report that 15 and 20
percent of the volatility of housing investment and housing prices is explained by monetary
6We set the persistence and standard deviation of the shocks as in Iacoviello and Neri (2009).
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factors, respectively. The last two columns show the effects of a positive productivity shock
in the consumption sector, Ac,t, and of a temporary increase in the access to credit, namely
an increase in mt.
A current unexpected decline in the interest rate induces agents to increase their current
expenditures. Aggregate demand rises and Borrowers significantly increase their level of
indebtedness and housing investment. Housing prices rise and the subsequent collateral effect
induces a sizable increase in Borrowers’ consumption. This shock generates co-movement
among the relevant variables but it fails to generate boom-bust dynamics.
A positive productivity shock in the consumption good sector generates hump-shaped
dynamics in most of the relevant variables but it is unable to generate co-movement between
hours worked in the consumption good sector and the other macroeconomic variables. In
fact, due to the presence of price stickiness, a positive productivity shock induces a decline
in hours worked in the consumption good sector.
A positive housing preference shock, i.e. a shift in preference for housing with respect
to consumption and leisure, is commonly interpreted as a housing demand shock. This
shock generates an increase in both house prices and the returns to housing investment.
As a consequence of the rise in housing prices, Borrowers face looser credit constraints and
increase their consumption expenditures. Similar dynamics are generated by a temporary
increase in the access to credit. In fact, following a current increase in the loan-to-value
ratio, mt, Borrower’s debt and therefore consumption and housing demand increase, which
lead to a rise in aggregate consumption, investment and GDP. However, both shocks fail in
generating co-movement between business investment and consumption.
In the case of a negative technology shock in the housing sector, aggregate housing
investment falls together with GDP. A negative technological shock leads to an increase in
construction costs and thus in housing prices. Aggregate housing investment falls. However,
due to rising housing prices, Borrowers can increase their indebtedness and their housing
demand. Consumption also rises through the collateral effect. Demand pressures make both
consumption goods’ production and inflation rise. However, given the decline in housing
investment, GDP falls.
To summarize, current shocks fail in either generating hump-shaped dynamics or the
observed co-movement among hours worked, investment, GDP and house prices.
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5 Expectations and Boom-Bust Dynamics
Previous literature on expectations-driven cycles focused mainly on expectations of future
macroeconomic developments related to productivity shocks. However, boom-bust cycles
in the housing market can be plausibly related to expectations of future developments in
different sectors of the economy. A novel element in this paper is the introduction of changes
in expectations on several other shocks that originate in the housing market, the credit
market and the conduct of monetary policy.
This section reports the dynamics of the model in response to news shocks and assesses
their ability to generate boom-bust cycles in the housing market like those seen in the
data. We define a boom-bust cycle as a hump-shaped co-movement of real house prices,
real consumption, real GDP, real business investment, real housing investment, hours in
the consumption and in the housing sector, real wages in the consumption and housing
sector, real interest rate and inflation. We show that several types of expectations can
generate fluctuations in the housing market. However, only changes in expectations about
the conduct of monetary policy can lead to a subsequent economic downturn.
5.1 Monetary Policy and Inflation
In the following we study the role of expectations of future monetary policy developments in
driving business cycle fluctuations in the housing market. We document that expectations
of a reduction of the policy rate or of a change in the central bank’s inflation target generate
macroeconomic booms that turn into busts if agents’ expectations are not realized ex-post.
We also consider the effects of expected future downward pressure in inflation, which also
generates boom-bust dynamics.
Figure 9 reports the effect of an expected four-period ahead one-period reduction in the
policy rate of 0.1 percentage points, namely an expected shock to uR,t (starred line). It also
illustrates the case in which news of a future negative shock to uR turn out to be wrong and
at time t = 4 there is no change in the policy rare (solid line).
Expectations of a future decrease in the policy rate that do not realize can generate
macroeconomic boom-bust dynamics. The intuition is as follows. Signals of future lower
policy rates generate expectations of a decline in the future real interest rate. Borrowers
anticipate this effect and increase their current consumption as servicing loans will be less
expensive. Demand pressure raises current inflation. The current ex-post real rate declines
13
reducing the debt service. The anticipation of expansionary monetary policy also creates
expectations of higher future housing prices that further induce Borrowers to increase their
current demand for housing and thus indebtedness. Due to limits to credit, impatient house-
holds increase their labor supply in order to raise internal funds for housing investments.
Savers face a reduction in their current and expected interest income. Thus, for this group
of agents consumption increases by less, current housing investment declines and their labor
supply increases significantly. Given the adjustment costs of capital, firms in the consump-
tion sector start adjusting the stock of capital already at the time in which news about a
future increase in productivity spread. This way, when the increase in productivity occurs,
capital is already in place. For the increase in investment to be coupled with an increase in
hours, wages rise in both sectors. GDP increases already at the time of the signal.7
In the case of an anticipated shock that realizes, aggregate variables boom and then
slowly decline (starred line). The peak response in output corresponds to the time in which
expectations realize. In contrast, if expectations do not realize there is a dramatic drop
in both quantities and prices. Aggregate variables fall below their initial level. It takes
about ten quarters for GDP to go back to the initial level. Expectations of looser monetary
policy that do not realize generate a macroeconomic boom-bust cycle followed by a recession
(solid line). Thus, good communication on monetary policy is essential for reducing the
occurrence of expectations-driven cycles and recessions. This result is robust to different
parametrization of the labor share income of credit-constrained agents, α, the loan to value
ratio, m, the capacity utilization rate, zc,t, and the labor mobility across sectors, ξ and ξ
′
.
See Appendix C.
We also consider the case where agents expect a persistent reduction in the policy rate.
For this experiment we set the persistence of the shock uR,t equal to 0.65 in order to capture
the situation where agents expect the policy rate to remain low for several periods. The
impulse responses are shown in Figure 10. In this case, the effect on housing prices and on
all other aggregate variables is stronger and the initial boom and the subsequent recession
are more pronounced relative to the case where the expected reduction in the policy rate is
only for one period.
Figure 11 documents the effect of expectations of a temporary but persistent upward
7As a consequence of the increase in inflation and GDP, the current policy rate (not shown in the graph),
that follows the Taylor-type rule described in (7), increases at the time of the signal, to decline only at the
time of occurrence of the shock.
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deviation in the central bank’s inflation target, a negative realization of us. The anticipation
of a higher target for inflation means higher long-run expected inflation. Firms that can
change prices adjust their price upwards already in the current period. Thus, expectations
of higher future inflation increase inflation already in the current period. Expectations of
a future reduction of the ex-post real interest rate coupled with a current reduction in the
nominal interest rate induce an increase in household indebtedness, higher consumption
and higher housing spending. Housing prices and housing investment increase. Due to
adjustment costs to capital, firms start adjusting the stock of capital already at the time of
the signal. Real wages and hours worked rise. The economy experiences a macroeconomic
boom. After the shock is realized all variables slowly return to their initial levels. Figure
11 also displays the behavior of the model economy when news on future central bank’s
target do not realize, i.e. the target does not increase in period four. As expected, at
time t = 5 quantities and prices drop. Housing prices, investment and GDP do not display
an hump-shaped pattern. Compared to the case of expectations of future expansionary
monetary policy, expectations of a temporary upward shift in the inflation target generate
a less sizable boom but a more pronounced bust.
Figure 12 documents how expected future downward pressure on inflation, namely a fu-
ture negative shock to up, affects the dynamics of the model. Because of price stickiness,
some firms already adjust their price downwards when news spread. Thus, expectations of
lower inflation in the future reduce inflation instantaneously. Current consumption expen-
diture increases, as well as investment. Expectations of higher future housing prices induce
Borrowers to increase their current demand for housing and therefore indebtedness. On the
other hand, a reduction in inflation raises the rate of return on nominal assets and makes
them more attractive. As a result, Savers increase the supply of loans and persistently de-
crease their demand for housing. Compared to the previous cases, expectations of a future
reduction in inflation lead to a more sizable boom but a milder bust.
5.2 Credit Shocks and Boom-Bust Cycles
Boom-bust cycles in asset prices are often associated with a similar behavior in private
credit.8 The results presented above show that the increase in housing prices generated by
changes in households’ expectations is coupled with an endogenous increase in household
8See also Borio and Lowe (2002) and Rabanal et al. (2009).
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indebtedness. An often-heard explanation for the last housing boom is an easing in credit
conditions. In the following we analyze the effects of an exogenous change in the access to
credit as proxied by shocks to the established loan-to-value ratio – in terms of our model, m.
When Borrowers forecast an increase in the access to credit, they postpone housing in-
vestment but increase their expenditure in consumption. Interest income falls for Savers,
who therefore reduce their consumption. Because a future increase in m will generate an
increase in housing demand at the expenses of consumption demand, firms in the consump-
tion sector reduce their capital. As a result, business investment falls. Hence, news about a
future increase in the access to credit generate opposite movements in business investment
and consumption, unlike what happens during a housing peak. See Figure 13.
We also consider the case in which agents expect the current favorable credit conditions to
be reversed in the near future. Figure 14 shows the effects of a one percentage point current
increase in m coupled with expectations of future restrictions in the access to credit, namely
with expectations that m will return to its original value after four periods (starred line). For
simplicity we analyze only the case in which news materialize. Relative to the previous case,
the impact on most variables is more sizable. Lower expected access to credit in the future
induce Borrowers to increase their current demand for loans and housing more relative to
the cases analyzed above. As a result, the increase in housing prices and housing investment
is more pronounced. Borrowers substitute consumption for housing and supply more labor
to take advantage of temporarily better access to credit. In contrast, Savers’ consumption
and business investment increase because of higher interest income and expected future lower
real interest rates.9 Aggregate consumption increases as well as GDP. Hours worked increase
substantially in both sectors. As a result, inflation and real wages fall slightly. Interestingly,
the dynamics of real wages is consistent with the empirical evidence on the housing peak
of 2006:2. The dynamics of inflation, however, is not consistent with such evidence. See
Appendix B.
5.3 Economic Activity
In this section we report the model’s dynamics in response to news related to future produc-
tivity in the consumption and investment sector and to future developments in the housing
9Due to habit formation, Savers slowly adjust consumption so as to peak at the time the real interest
rate is lowest.
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market.
According to Beautry and Portier (2006) business cycle fluctuations in the data are pri-
marily driven by changes in agents’ expectations about future technological growth. In fact,
they first documented that stock prices movements anticipate future growth in total factor
productivity and that such dynamics are accompanied by a macroeconomic boom. More
recently, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) show that innovations in expectations of future
neutral productivity shocks, permanent investment-specific shocks, and government spend-
ing shocks account for more than two thirds of predicted aggregate fluctuations in postwar
United States.10 However, as already shown by Beautry and Portier (2004, 2007), a standard
one-sector optimal growth model is unable to generate boom-bust cycles in response to news.
At the time of the signal consumption increases and hours worked fall thanks to the wealth
effect generated by expectations of improved future macroeconomic conditions. Since tech-
nology has not improved yet, output decreases. In order for consumption to increase despite
the reduction in hours worked, investment has to fall. Thus, good news creates a boom in
private consumption and a decline in hours worked, investment and output. Several papers
explore the role of alternative modeling features in the transmission of expectations-driven
cycles. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008) introduce three elements in an otherwise standard neo-
classical growth model: Variable capital utilization; adjustment costs to investment; and a
weak short-run wealth elasticity of labor supply. This latter element is introduced by assum-
ing a generalized version of the preference specification considered by Greenwood, Huffman,
Hercowitz (1988). A one-sector model displays co-movement of consumption, output, invest-
ment and hours worked in response to news about future total factor productivity or about
investment-specific technology. The value of the firm, however, falls unless the production
function features decreasing returns to scale as stemming from a factor of production in fixed
10The empirical literature on news shocks is growing rapidly. Barsky and Sims (2009) show that news
shocks on future technology are positively correlated with consumption, stock prices and consumer confidence
innovation and negatively correlated with inflation innovations. Moreover, they explain a large share of
variation in aggregate consumption at most horizons but a significant share of stock prices variations only at
lower frequencies. In contrast, Khan and Tsoukalas (2009) findings suggest that news shocks on productivity
are not very important in estimated sticky price and wages DSGE models. According to Kurmann and Otrok
(2010) new shocks about future productivity significantly contribute to explain swings in the slope of the
term structure.
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supply.11
Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008) show that a standard one-sector real busi-
ness cycle model with habit persistence and costs of adjusting the flow of investment generates
a boom-bust pattern in output, consumption, investment and hours in response to news on
productivity that do not materialize. The price of capital, however, is negatively correlated
with all other aggregate variables and therefore it falls and then increases. The introduction
of an inflation targeting central bank and sticky nominal wages make the price of capital
co-move with the other aggregate variables and boom-bust dynamics emerge. We show
that expectation-driven cycles emerge also in a model of the housing market that features
collateralized household debt, standard preferences and production functions and nominal
rigidities, both in prices and wages. However, differently from news on other sources of
macroeconomic fluctuations such as lending standards and monetary policy, expectations of
future productivity fail in generating the subsequent economic downturn displayed by the
data.
We also consider the possibility of boom-bust cycles in housing prices generated by ex-
pectations of future developments in the housing market. We show that housing-market
cycles driven by expectations on future developments in the demand and supply of houses
are characterized by boom-bust dynamics. However, only expectations of a future reduction
in the supply of houses generate boom-bust cycles in all aggregate quantities such as output,
consumption, hours and investment as in the data.
5.3.1 Productivity in the Consumption and Investment-Good Sector of Pro-
duction
Expectations of future productivity gains generate boom-bust dynamics in GDP, consump-
tion, hours, investment and house prices. See Figure 15. The intuition is as follows. Ex-
pectations of higher productivity in the future lead households to increase their current
consumption expenditure. Due to demand pressures, inflation increases. At the same time,
11Other papers have focused on different mechanisms. Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2006) consider
a labor market matching mechanism; Floden (2007) incorporates variable capital utilization and vintage
capital; Kobayashi, Nakajima and Inaba (2007) and Walentin (2007) show that expectations-driven cycles
can arise in models with credit constraints on firms; Nutahara (2009) prove that in contrast to external
habits, internal habits can help to generate co-movement in response to news on future productivity.
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the anticipation of higher productivity in the future generates expectations of higher future
housing prices. The decline in the current real rate coupled with higher expected housing
prices lead to an increase in Borrowers’ housing expenditure and indebtedness. Given the
presence of limits to credit, impatient households increase their labor supply in order to raise
internal funds for housing investment. Due to capital adjustment costs, firms already begin
adjusting the stock of capital when news about a future reduction in the policy rate spread.
For the increase in business investment to be coupled with an increase in total hours worked,
wages must rise. The increase in business and housing investment makes GDP increase al-
ready at the time of the signal. A four-period anticipated increase in productivity generates
a boom in housing prices, housing investment, consumption, GDP, hours and indebtedness.
The peak response of all aggregate variables corresponds to the time in which expectations
realize. After that all variables slowly return to their initial values. In contrast, if expec-
tations do not realize there is a more substantial drop in both quantities and prices (solid
line). See Appendix C for robustness analysis to different parameter values.
Appendix D disentangles the contribution of the different modeling choices. As in Chris-
tiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008) we show that price and wage stickiness have an
important role for expectations on future productivity to generate co-movement between
house prices and consumption, investment and hours worked. However, contrary to them,
we obtain boom-bust dynamics in all aggregate variables and real wages. In our model
house prices co-move with the other aggregate variables independently of whether wages are
stickier than prices or vice versa. Intuitively, the increase in housing demand and therefore
housing prices in response to news allows for an increase in both real wages and hours in the
housing sector that spills over the consumption sector. The empirical evidence in Figure 3
seems to suggest that real wages are not below trend before a peak in house prices and that
they increase throughout the boom phase. Notice also that the asset-price peak in the first
quarter of the year 2000-2001 to which Christiano et al. (2008) refer to was preceded by a
rapid increase in real wages both in the consumption-good and in the housing sector – see
Figure 1.12
Figure 16 shows the effects of expectations of a future increase in the cost of transforming
12In their model, the increase in hours is possible because the real wage falls, hence producers are willing to
raise labor demand. Since nominal wages are sticky, a decrease in real wages occurs because prices fall faster
than wages. The inflation-targeting central bank responds to this fall in inflation by cutting the nominal
interest rate, which in turn raises investment and the price of capital.
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output into capital, Ak. Agents are willing to increase their labor supply in order to reduce
the future negative effect of the shock. Consumption and housing expenditures increase. The
increase in aggregate housing demand makes housing prices rise as well. Housing investment
increases. Thus, the stock of capital used as input of production increases in both the
consumption- and housing-good sector and total business investment goes up. As a result
of the increase in the production of consumption goods, housing investment and business
investment, GDP rises. Unrealized expectations induce a faster return to the initial state.
5.3.2 Supply and Demand in the Housing Market
Figure 17 shows that expectations of a future decline in productivity in the housing sector,
a fall in Ah,t, makes agents increase their labor supply in order to reduce the future negative
effect of the shock. Moreover, news of negative housing supply shocks generate expectations
of a future increase in house prices. To take advantage of lower current prices, Borrowers
increase their current housing demand. Thus, both indebtedness and consumption expendi-
ture increase. Due to adjustment costs in capital, firms start adjusting the stock of capital
already at the time of news.13 As a result, business investment slightly decreases on im-
pact. Despite this, GDP rises due to the increase in housing investment and consumption.
A four-period anticipated decline in productivity (starred line) generates a boom in hous-
ing prices, housing investment, consumption, GDP, hours and indebtedness. Still, current
business investment slightly falls.
Figure 18 shows the response of the model economy to expectations of a future increase
in housing demand due to a housing preference shock, an increase in j. Anticipating a
future increase in housing prices, Borrowers raise their current demand for houses and thus
indebtedness and consumption. Firms in the housing sector start adjusting their capital
holding at the time of the signal and housing investment increases. Due to an expected
shift in preference for housing relative to consumption, firms in the consumption sector
reduce their stock of capital. As a result, business investment falls. Despite the decline in
business investment, GDP rises. Because of the reduction in business investment during the
boom phase, news about a future increase in housing demand fail to generate boom-bust
dynamics consistent with the data. In the data business investment starts increasing already
13The stock of capital (not shown in the graph) used as input of production in the consumption sector
increases while it decreases in the housing sector.
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six periods before the peak in housing prices; in the model, however, it declines throughout
the boom phase. Figure 19 considers the effect of an anticipated increase in housing demand
at different time horizons: n = {4, 6, 8} . Expectations of a change in housing demand further
in the future only postpone the occurrence of the peak. The behavior of business investment
is independent of the time horizon of the expected increase in housing demand. The decline
in business investment is also robust to different parametrization of key model’s parameters.
See Appendix C.
6 Credit Market and Housing Market Fluctuations
Are economies characterized by lower lending standards more vulnerable to boom-bust cycles
in the housing market? We analyze how credit market conditions affect the steady state of
the model, the transmission of news shocks and the implied volatility. We borrow from
previous literature the notion that the collateral requirement, m, can serve as proxy for
credit market development.14 To be precise, tighter collateral constraints (lower values of
m) result in a smaller size of the mortgage market and thereby characterize economies with
a higher degree of frictions in the credit market.
6.1 Long-run Effects
Figure 20 shows that increased access to the credit market, namely a higher value of m, im-
plies a credit expansion in the steady state and thus larger housing investment by Borrowers.
In contrast, Borrowers’ consumption decreases with an increase in m. An environment with
a lower degree of credit frictions allows impatient agents to consume more in the present
than in the future. Hence their steady-state consumption level is lower. On the contrary,
Savers are better able to postpone consumption, thereby raising their steady-state consump-
tion level. Total consumption as well as business and residential investment increase at the
steady state with higher values of m. Increased housing demand leads to higher housing
prices that further contribute to higher indebtedness. A reduced level of consumption for
Borrowers is coupled with higher labor supply. Despite the decline in hours for Savers,
overall labor supply and GDP increase with m. To sum up, a lower degree of credit fric-
14See, among others, Aghion et al. (2003), Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), Mendicino (2007), Calza,
Monacelli and Stracca (2009).
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tions characterizes economies with higher levels of indebtedness, investment, production and
consumption.
6.2 Transmission Mechanism
To document the role of the degree of credit frictions for the transmission of expectations-
driven business cycles, we consider the case of expectations of a future lower policy interest
rate. Figure 21 compares the transmission of news shocks in the case of the benchmark loan-
to-value ratio (m=0.85) with a lower (m=0.20) and a higher (m =0.95) value. Consumption,
GDP and indebtedness are quite sensitive to the degree of credit frictions and they show more
pronounced booms and busts as the value of m increases. On the other hand, the responses
of the other aggregate variables are barely affected. The degree of credit frictions plays an
important role at the individual level. In particular, the response of Borrower’s consumption
and housing demand to the news shock and to its missing realization are magnified by lower
credit constraints.
The first three columns of Figure 22 show the contemporaneous, peak and cumulated
(over the boom phase) response to an expected reduction in the policy rate. The last three
columns show, respectively, the period-5 response for capturing the effect of unfulfilled ex-
pectations, the trough and the cumulated (over the bust phase) response. A lower degree
of credit frictions implies larger sensitivity of Borrowers’ consumption to changes in expec-
tations. Economies with easier access to the credit market respond to the anticipation of
future favorable monetary policy developments with larger increases in indebtedness. Thus,
short-run changes in Borrower’s expenditures are more sizable, especially the rise in housing
investment as it allows a further increase in borrowing. In the short run Savers raise their
consumption but reduce their holding of houses. The contemporaneous positive response for
consumption and negative one for housing demand become more polarized as m gets bigger
and closer to one. Intuitively, this is a rational response to the increase of housing prices
during the boom phase. Moreover, substituting housing with consumption makes Savers able
to maintain a similar increase in consumption independently of the degree of credit frictions.
As a result, total consumption displays larger contemporaneous and boom responses with
higher values of m, as shown in Figures 21 and 22.
Borrower’s consumption and housing investment display deeper troughs and more sizable
cumulated busts in more developed credit markets. In economies with a low degree of
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credit frictions Borrowers are more leveraged. When expectations do not materialize, the
drop in Borrowers’ consumption expenditure is more sizable, which in turn makes aggregate
consumption more responsive to unrealized expectations - see the top part of Figure 23. In
contrast, housing prices, business and residential investment display cumulated booms and
busts of smaller magnitude as m gets bigger. Similar results hold for the case of a change in
expectations about future productivity, as shown in the bottom part of Figure 23.
6.3 Volatility
Figure 24 shows how the degree of credit market development affects macroeconomic volatil-
ity in the presence of news shocks. The volatilities of consumption, household debt and hours
worked in the consumption sector increase with an increase m. In contrast, the volatilities
of housing prices, housing investment and business investment decline. The volatility of
aggregate housing investment declines despite the increase in the volatility of individual
investment. Aggregate housing investment becomes less volatile because the correlation be-
tween housing investment by the two types of agents falls. Housing demand by Borrowers
and Savers move in oppositive directions in response to news on monetary policy and the
difference grows larger as the degree of credit frictions falls. Accordingly, the volatility of
hours worked increases in the consumption-good sector while it decreases in the housing
sector as m rises.
The behavior of the standard deviation of GDP depends crucially on how this variable is
measured. Iacoviello and Neri (2009) define GDP as the sum of consumption and investment
(business and housing) at steady-state prices. Variations in GDP are only due to variations in
quantities. The volatility of GDP increases despite a reduction in the volatility of the relative
price of housing and of the two investment components. If we allow for changes in the relative
price of investment to enter the measurement of GDP, the volatility of GDP declines with
the degree of credit frictions – see Figure 25.15 The sensitivity of the other variables to the
degree of credit frictions is not affected by the way we measure GDP. Movements in relative
prices play an important role in the transmission of shocks to GDP.16
15In recent years, an increasing number of countries have changed from the constant price measure of GDP
to the chain volume measure of GDP that takes into account movements in relative prices. See among others
the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, UK, Hong Kong and most European economies.
16This result is in accordance with Mendicino (2007). The author, using a real business cycle model in
23
7 Conclusions
We study the role of expectations-driven fluctuations in generating boom-bust cycle dynamics
in the housing market. First, we document that the cyclical behavior of housing prices
and housing investment is coupled with a similar pattern in GDP, business investment,
consumption, hours worked and real wages. Then we show that expectations about the
future state of productivity, investment cost, housing supply, inflation, the policy rate and the
central bank’s target can generate housing-market booms in accordance with the empirical
findings. However, only expectations of either a future reduction in the policy rate or a
temporary increase in the central bank’s inflation target that are not fulfilled can generate
macroeconomic recessions. Thus, good communication on monetary policy is essential for
reducing the occurrence of expectations-driven cycles.
Regarding the role of the credit market in housing market fluctuations, we document
that easier access to credit can generate boom-bust cycles dynamics only if agents expect
current favorable credit conditions to be reversed in the near future. We also show that more
developed credit markets are characterized by higher sensitivity of consumption and house-
hold indebtedness to changes in expectations. However, if the measurement of GDP allows
for variable relative prices, more developed credit markets may experience lower volatility of
real GDP.
A quantitative assessment of the relative importance of each shock in generating boom-
bust cycles through estimation requires separate consideration. The role of monetary policy,
as well as the analysis of the optimal conduct of monetary policy, is also left to future
research.
which entrepreneurs borrow in order to partly finance their investment in capital, highlights the key role of
the relative price of capital in shaping the relation between collateral requirements and the transmission of
shocks to GDP.
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Tables and Figures
Correlation with QQHP
1965:1 to 2009:2 Boom-Bust Episodes
GDPHP 0.60 0.64
CCHP 0.54 0.60
IKHP 0.55 0.58
IHHP 0.49 0.53
RLOANSHP 0.76 0.84
NCHP 0.62 0.62
NHHP 0.71 0.71
RRQHP 0.11 0.09
INFLQHP 0.29 0.23
RWCPCHP 0.20 0.31
RWHPCHP -0.10 0
Standard Deviation
GDPHP 1.56 1.65
CCHP 1.85 2.13
IKHP 5.08 4.83
IHHP 10.23 12.41
RLOANSHP 2.46 2.47
NCHP 1.69 1.76
NHHP 4.38 4.60
RRQHP 0.38 0.48
INFLQHP 0.40 0.51
RWCPCHP 0.99 1.32
RWHPCHP 1.15 1.42
QQHP 2.23 2.31
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for H-P filtered data: Full Sample and Boom-Bust Episodes.
All series are de-trended using the H-P filter. Standard deviation in percentage points.
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Variables during Peaks: Average over all Peaks
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Figure 3: H-P-filtered Macroeconomic Variables during Peaks: Average over all Peaks
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Figure 4: 1973:3 Peak
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Figure 5: 1979:4 Peak
31
.28
.30
.32
.34
.36
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real House Prices
.40
.42
.44
.46
.48
.50
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real Consumption
.34
.36
.38
.40
.42
.44
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real GDP
.56
.60
.64
.68
.72
.76
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real Business Investment
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real Residential Investment
.60
.64
.68
.72
.76
.80
.84
.88
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real Loans
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Hours Worked, Consumption Sector
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Hours Worked, Housing Sector
.132
.136
.140
.144
.148
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real Wage, Consumption Sector
.19
.20
.21
.22
.23
.24
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real Wage, Housing Sector
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
.010
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Real Interest Rate
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Inflation
Figure 6: 1989:2 Peak
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Figure 7: 2006:2 Peak
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Figure 8: Contemporaneous Shocks
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Figure 23: Cumulated Responses over the Boom and Bust Phase relative to m
48
F
ig
u
re
24
:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
on
C
h
an
ge
(%
)
re
la
ti
ve
to
m
49
Figure 25: GDP Standard Deviation Change (%) relative to m at Constant and Variable
Relative Prices
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APPENDIX
(not for publication)
Expectations-Driven Cycles in the Housing Market
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A Data
CC : Aggregate Consumption. Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (seasonally ad-
justed, billions of chained 2005 dollars, Table 1.1.6), divided by the Civilian Noninsti-
tutional Population (CNP16OV, source: Bureau of Labor Statistics). Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA).
GDP : Gross Domestic Product. Real Gross Domestic Product (seasonally adjusted, bil-
lions of chained 2005 dollars, Table 1.1.6), divided by CNP16OV. Source: BEA.
IK : Business Fixed Investment. Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment (seasonally
adjusted, billions of chained 2005 dollars, Table 1.1.6), divided by CNP16OV. Source:
BEA.
IH : Residential Investment. Real Private Residential Fixed Investment (seasonally ad-
justed, billions of chained 2005 dollars, Table 1.1.6.), divided by CNP16OV. Source:
BEA.
INFLQ : Inflation. Quarter on quarter log differences in the implicit price deflator for the
nonfarm business sector, demeaned. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
RRQ : Real Short-term Interest Rate. 3-month Treasury Bill Rate (Secondary Mar-
ket Rate), expressed in quarterly units, minus quarter on quarter log difference in
the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business sector; demeaned. (Series ID:
H15/RIFSGFSM03 NM). Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
QQ : Real House Prices. Census Bureau House Price Index (new one-family houses sold
including value of lot) deflated with the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business
sector. Source: Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/const/price sold cust.xls.
NC : Hours in Consumption Sector. Total Nonfarm Payrolls (Series ID: PAYEMS in Saint
Louis Fed Fred2) less all employees in the construction sector (Series ID: USCONS),
times Average Weekly Hours of Production Workers (series ID: CES0500000007), di-
vided by CNP160V. Source: BLS.
NH : Hours in Housing Sector. All Employees in the Construction Sector (Series ID:
USCONS in Saint Louis Fed Fred2), times Average Weekly Hours of Construction
Workers (series ID: CES2000000007), divided by CNP16OV. Source: BLS
52
RWCPC : Real Wage in Consumption-good Sector. Average Hourly Earnings of Produc-
tion/ Nonsupervisory Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls, Total Private (Series ID:
CES0500000008), divided by the price index for Personal Consumption Expenditure
(Table 2.3.4, source: BEA). Source: BLS.
RWHPC : Real Wage in Housing Sector. Average Hourly Earnings of Production/Nonsupervisory
Workers in the Construction Industry (Series ID: CES2000000008), divided by the
price index for Personal Consumption Expenditure (Table 2.3.4, source: BEA). Source:
BLS.
RLOANS : Households and nonprofit organizations home mortgages liability (seasonally
adjusted, millions of current dollars), divided by the implicit price deflator and divided
by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. Source: The Federal Reserve Board (Se-
ries ID: Z1/Z1/LA153165105.Q).
Note: In the figures and tables GDP, Consumption, Business Investment, Residential In-
vestment, Hours in the Consumption Sector, Hours in the Housing Sector, House Prices, Real
Wage in the Consumption Sector and Real Wage in the Housing Sector are log-transformed
and normalized to zero in 1965:1.
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B Housing Prices Peaks: 1965:1-2009:2
Figures 4 to 7 of the paper illustrate the behavior of our macroeconomic variables (not
Hodrick-Prescott filtered) during the four housing peak episodes. These graphs show that
the behavior of our “average” series represents well the four episodes. In all cases, real
GDP, private consumption, real private residential and nonresidential fixed investment co-
move with real house prices in a bell-shaped dynamics, with small differences in different
housing price peaks. These differences, however, are worth commenting on. Inflation behaves
differently in the 1973:3 boom-bust episode. Inflation decreases slightly in the ten quarters
preceding the peak in real house prices and it increases sharply in the next six quarters,
from 1973:3 to 1975:1. Annual inflation went from 3 to 16 percentage points over that
period. Notice, however, that inflation is high at the beginning of the boom-bust episode
in 1971 as a consequence of the Vietnam War. Moreover, the first oil shock contributes to
the sharp rise in inflation of 1975:1, the highest level since World War I. Real wages also
behave differently in the last housing peak of 2006:2 relative to the previous ones. The peak
in real house prices occurs roughly at the trough of real wages in both sectors in this housing
boom-bust episode. In particular, it appears that nominal wages have not fallen at all in
the construction sector and have fallen very little in the consumption-good sector since the
beginning of the recession. We speculate that the real wage dynamics in the last boom-bust
episode are driven by the combination of rapidly falling prices and sticky nominal wages that
have not adjusted yet.
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C Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented in Sections 4 and 5 of the paper are robust to different parametrization
of the labor share income of credit-constrained agents, α, the loan-to-value ratio, m, the
capacity utilization rate, zc,t, and the labor mobility across sectors, ξ and ξ
′
. We consider the
parameter values at the mean (benchmark case), at the 2.5 and the 97.5 percent probability
interval of the posterior distribution as estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2009). Figures A-1
to A-4 illustrate the implications of different parameter values. All figures show very little
sensitivity in the response of the aggregate variables to these parameters.
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D Expectations about Future Productivity
The model presented above features several real and nominal rigidities. In order to disentan-
gle the contribution of the different modeling choices, we introduce the frictions one at the
time. Figure A-5 displays the boom-bust response to news on productivity in the flexible-
price version of the model. In the absence of adjustment costs of capital and when impatient
households cannot borrow (dashed line), i.e. when m = 0, the wealth effect dominates and
agents increase both consumption and leisure. To increase consumption households reduce
their investment expenditures (in all sectors). When it is costly to adjust the stock of capital,
the reduction in business investment and thus the increase in consumption is less pronounced
(starred line). Allowing for borrowing against the value of collateral leads to a more pro-
nounced increase in Borrower’s housing demand (solid line). In this last case, Borrower’s
consumption increases by more in the boom phase and the decline in Borrower’s hours (not
shown in the graph) is more sizable. Saver’s demand for housing declines. Since Savers
account for about eighty percent of labor income, aggregate housing production declines and
housing prices fall. To sum up, adjustment costs and the collateral effect are not enough to
generate boom-bust dynamics in the absence of nominal rigidities.
Figures A-6 shows the response of the economy with nominal rigidity in the price of
the consumption good but no wage rigidities (dashed line). Expectations of higher future
productivity lead to a decrease in expected inflation, which in turn reduces the expected real
interest rate. The decline in the current real interest rate coupled with a higher expected real
rate lead to an increase in current debt and thus Borrowers’ consumption, Borrowers’ housing
demand and Savers’ consumption. On the contrary, Savers reduce their housing demand and
increase their supply of labor. For a contemporaneous increase in business investment and
hours, the rise in wages in the consumption sector needs to be significant. Aggregate housing
investment first declines and then slowly increases; housing prices increase as well as current
inflation. However, compared to the case with flexible prices, inflation rises by less, thereby
allowing for a more pronounced increase in consumption.
In the additional presence of wage stickiness in the consumption sector, the wage in the
consumption sector increases by less (starred line), which raises the demand for labor and
therefore hours in the consumption sector. Moreover, since the sectorial wage differential is
more pronounced, Savers increase their labor supply in the housing sector as well. Thus, the
model displays co-movement of GDP, consumption, business investment and housing prices
over the boom-bust cycle. Housing investment and hours in the housing sector, however, fall
56
because wages in the housing sector increase substantially, thereby reducing labor demand
in the sector. To obtain a boom in investment and hours in the housing sector it is necessary
to introduce wage stickiness in the housing sector.
Finally, we add wage stickiness in both sectors of production (solid line). Since wage
stickiness is more sizable in the housing sector, the increase in wage in that sector is less
pronounced. Due to a further reduction in the current income effect, agents increase their
labor supply by more. Aggregate housing investment increases more so that housing prices
rise less. Household debt increases less but aggregate consumption is barely affected relative
to the case of no wage stickiness in the housing sector. Thus, in the presence of nominal price
and wage rigidities, expectations of future productivity gains generate empirically plausible
boom-bust cycle dynamics.
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